There is a war one hears about in the news and assumes it is far away, something happening in other countries. But there are moments when that war turns into reality, leaving the media and arriving at the gates of your own home.
What happened in Uvira is exactly what happened to Burundi. The war in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which had for years been followed in Bujumbura as someone else’s conflict, suddenly found itself just 25 kilometers from the country’s capital.
President Evariste Ndayishimiye, who had sent troops to eastern Congo believing it was a distant battlefield, never imagined that fighting that began thousands of kilometers away would end up so close to his own country, instilling fear in the hearts of leaders and citizens alike.
The capture of Uvira was more than a military story. It was an economic, security, and state prestige crisis. The city had become Burundi’s last vital corridor for fuel products, sugar, cooking oil, and agricultural goods from Congo, especially after the closure of borders with Rwanda in January 2024. Uvira was a lifeline for the country.
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Beyond economics, however, Ndayishimiye’s fear was rooted in the fate of his troops. They had established positions in the territories of Uvira, Fizi, and Mwenga. The fall of the city raised urgent questions: how would those soldiers return home? Which routes would they use? How would they survive when the forces they were fighting had already reached areas near Burundi’s border?
There was another concern that troubled him even more: the RED-Tabara rebel group opposing his government. The Burundian president knew very well that if AFC/M23 allowed this group to pass through areas under its control, Burundi could quickly turn into a battlefield.
However, AFC/M23 chose to send a message different from what many expected. It informed Ndayishimiye that it was ready to allow Burundian troops to withdraw peacefully if they wished, assured him that it would never permit RED-Tabara to pass through areas it controls, and stated that it would not close the Gatumba–Kavimvira border so that trade between Bujumbura and Uvira could continue.
Those assurances failed to calm Burundi. Ndayishimiye instead ordered the immediate closure of the border on the Burundian side, citing “security reasons.” That decision reflected a deep loss of trust.
The betrayal of the Banyamulenge community, including allowing attacks against them using drones reportedly launched from Bujumbura, had already plunged him into a crisis of confidence. He saw no guarantee that AFC/M23 would honor its promises. Emergency meetings among senior military officials continued, but the conclusion was the same: there was no other option but to withdraw defeated troops.
From the morning of December 9, vehicles and boats were dispatched to Uvira and Tanganyika Province. Burundian soldiers began returning home, although some remained hidden in the forests of Fizi and Mwenga, fearing routes that had been overtaken by war.
As Burundi sank into fear, the capture of Uvira sent shockwaves across the entire region. It is the third-largest city in eastern Congo after Goma and Bukavu. For those who do not closely follow regional politics and security, it appeared as if this was the biggest city AFC/M23 had ever seized. Diplomatic and media pressure on Rwanda increased, while Burundi’s anxiety deepened.
Yet shortly afterward, AFC/M23 announced its withdrawal from the city. On the night of December 16, two minutes before midnight, Corneille Nangaa posted a statement on X declaring that fighters of the coalition had left Uvira, which they had entered on December 9, 2025.
For many, this announcement was confusing. But for political analysts, nothing extraordinary had happened. They recalled that on March 22, 2025, AFC/M23 had also withdrawn from Walikale after just three days, in an effort to give peace talks a chance.
The withdrawal from Uvira followed the same logic: a step meant to strengthen prospects for peace talks being held in Doha, Qatar. From AFC/M23’s perspective, this was not a defeat. It was a message showing that the group does not prioritize war, and that it continues to support the path of peace it has advocated since 2017, before Gen. Sultani Makenga left exile in Uganda and returned to the forests of Congo.
Observers of peace negotiations know that controlling territory increases a party’s leverage at the negotiating table. In 2022, AFC/M23 controlled only Bunagana. Today, it controls Goma and Bukavu. The capture of Uvira was a reminder to President Tshisekedi that delaying the Doha talks comes at a cost, and that AFC/M23 is prepared to apply pressure if necessary.
Some journalists and social media commentators claimed that statements condemning Rwanda after the capture of Uvira were what forced AFC/M23 to withdraw. This is a misunderstanding rooted in confusion between different agreements.
The fighting that led to the capture of Uvira was not related to the Washington agreements between Rwanda and Congo, but rather to the Doha agreements between Congo and AFC/M23. The Washington agreements aim to build trust between the two states, eliminate the FDLR, and remove Rwanda’s defensive security measures. The Doha process, on the other hand, focuses on halting the fighting between FARDC and AFC/M23.
It is normal in internal conflicts for diplomatic messages to be conveyed through third countries. Just as messages to Hamas pass through Qatar or Egypt, or communications with the TPLF once went through Kenya and South Africa, it is normal for messages intended for AFC/M23 to pass through Rwanda.
President Paul Kagame himself stated this in an interview with Jeune Afrique in January 2023, where he said it was possible to speak with M23 leaders in order to stop the fighting. On December 11, 2025, he again explained how AFC/M23 withdrew from Walikale at the request of partners seeking peace, only for FARDC to exploit that withdrawal and launch attacks.
As Nangaa stated, the withdrawal from Uvira was done at the request of the United States, to give the Doha talks a chance. Therefore, speaking of pressure on Rwanda ignores the facts: Rwanda was not in Uvira, nor is it part of the Doha negotiations. What likely happened is that Rwanda served as a channel for a request, which AFC/M23 could either accept or reject.
Uvira thus remains a powerful symbol: of Burundi’s fear, of AFC/M23’s message, and of the fragile hope for peace in eastern Congo. Because if FARDC and its allies resume killing civilians and launching attacks, war could once again return to Burundi’s doorstep, and to the entire region.
