As insecurity continues to escalate in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), relations between the armed coalition AFC/M23 and neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda are under renewed international scrutiny. Recent public statements by Rwandan and AFC/M23 officials have added new detail to an already contentious debate over cross-border security cooperation in the Great Lakes region.
Last week, Rwanda’s ambassador to the United States, Mathilde Mukantabana, told US lawmakers in Washington that Kigali maintains security cooperation with AFC/M23, citing shared security concerns. She identified the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as a key threat, describing the group as responsible for destabilizing eastern Congo and posing risks to Rwanda’s national security.
The FDLR includes individuals linked to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and has remained active in parts of North and South Kivu for years.
Ambassador Mukantabana said Rwanda’s engagement aims to prevent cross-border attacks and protect vulnerable communities, including Congolese Tutsi populations. Congolese officials interpreted her remarks as confirmation of Rwandan support for AFC/M23 an allegation Kigali has consistently denied in the past.
AFC/M23 leader Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo has rejected claims that the group receives military assistance from Rwanda, arguing that cooperation should not be conflated with armed support. Speaking to journalists in Goma, Nangaa said the movement coordinates with both Rwanda and Uganda on shared security challenges and border management.
“Cooperation does not mean military backing,” Nangaa said, adding that coordination focuses on threats posed by armed groups such as the FDLR and on managing civilian movement across borders.
AFC/M23 says it has detained suspected FDLR fighters in areas under its control and transferred them to relevant authorities, describing this as part of efforts to protect civilians.
The movement presents itself as defending marginalised communities in eastern Congo, particularly Congolese Tutsi populations who say they have faced long-standing persecution by armed groups. Critics, including the Congolese government, accuse AFC/M23 of undermining state authority and exacerbating regional instability.
In the past year, AFC/M23 seized control of key urban centres, including Goma and later Bukavu, following heavy fighting with Congolese forces, allied militias and contingents from the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO.
Despite ongoing conflict, major border crossings between Rwanda and AFC/M23-controlled areas including Grande Barrière, Petite Barrière, Rusizi and Bugarama remain operational. AFC/M23 estimates that tens of thousands of civilians cross daily for trade, work and essential activities.
Nangaa said similar coordination exists with Uganda at the Bunagana and Ishasha border points, aimed at facilitating trade and movement between Uganda and eastern Congo. He maintained that such arrangements are administrative rather than military in nature.
AFC/M23 also stated that individuals accused of crimes in areas under its control who flee into Rwanda are not transferred to Congolese authorities in Kinshasa but referred to relevant jurisdictions based on their place of origin.
The differing interpretations of these cross-border arrangements highlight the complexity of the conflict in eastern DRC, where overlapping security interests, regional politics and civilian survival intersect. While regional cooperation is viewed with suspicion by Congolese authorities and some international observers, those involved argue it reflects practical responses to insecurity in a long-running and deeply entrenched conflict.
